The new technology of the transportation revolution was not very safe. Steamboats ran aground, tipped over, sank, and exploded with disarming frequency. They crashed into other ships, bridges, and anything that might get in their way. Railroad trains were no safer. They too crashed, fell off
Where several persons are employed in the conduct of one common enterprise or undertaking, and the safety of each depends much on the care and skill with which each other shall perform his appropriate duty, each is an observer of the conduct of the others, can give notice of any misconduct, incapacity or neglect of duty, and leave the service, if the common employer will not take such precautions, and employ such agents as the safety of the party may require. By these means, the safety of each will be much more effectually secured, than could be done by a resort to the common employer for indemnity in case of loss by the negligence of each other.'0 Much in Farwell is problematic. Shaw's motives or agenda are certainly open to question." Shaw's analysis rested on the dubious assumption that a worker was in a better position than a manager to watch over the actions of his "fellow servant." In complex industries like railroads it was likely that workers might be harmed by the negligence of fellow servants they had never seen or met. 12 It would have been impossible for Farwell to police the actions of the switchman without stopping the train at every switch. This would have destroyed the efficiency of the railroad.13 Nevertheless, Shaw concluded that economic efficiency required that an injured worker "must bear the loss himself, or seek his remedy, if he have any, against the actual wrong-doer."
14 For Farwell this meant suing the presumably judgment proof negligent switchman. Thus, the efficiency Shaw opted for was one which ultimately placed a great deal of the burden of industrialization on those workers who were injured, maimed, or killed by accidents. In addition to this 'tort' analysis of industrial accidents, Shaw offered a relatively simplistic 'contract' analysis. Shaw noted that Farwell received a raise-to two dollars a day-as an engineer. Shaw argued that Farwell 10. Id. at 59. 11. Most of Shaw's assumptions in this case are dubious. Given the precarious nature of nineteenth century industrial employment, for example, it is unlikely that most employees would have been in a position to "leave the service" of their employers over questions of safety. For criticism of this case, see Levy, supra note 2; Horwitz, supra note 3; Marston, supra note 4; Friedman, supra note 2.
12. Shaw admitted this, noting that in a rope factory, "several may be at work on the same piece of cordage, at the same time, at many hundred feet distant from each other, and beyond the reach of sight and voice, and yet acting together." Farwell, 4 met. at 60. Shaw used this example to support his position that it would be impossible to draw fine lines between workers who were interdependent, and therefore truly "fellow servants," and workers who were not really "fellow servants." Since "it would be extremely difficult to establish a practical rule" for determining which workers were co-workers and which were not, id., Shaw opted for a simple-and thoroughly unrealistic-solution: all workers employed by the same company were fellow servants.
13. Farwell, 4 met. at 59. This is an example of what Morton Horwitz correctly calls the use of "law in order to encourage social change" and an example of a judge "play[ing] a central role in directing the course of social change." Horwitz, supra note 3, at 4, 1. This change benefitted entrepreneurs at the expense of workers.
14. Farwell 4 met. at 59. took this job with "a full knowledge of the risks incident to the employment," and by accepting the new job, with a higher wage, Farwell was assuming the risks that came with the job. In Farwell Shaw found three categories of job safety which he believed depended on good relations between workers, rather than management. First, he noted "the safety of each [worker] depends much on the care and skill with which each other shall perform his appropriate duty"-a 'mutual skill' category. Next Shaw found that in the workplace "each [worker] is the observer of the conduct of the others,"-thus a category of 'mutual observer.' This led Shaw to assert that each worker "can give notice of misconduct, incapacity or neglect of duty,"-a category of 'mutual notice.' Thus, if workers carefully monitored each other "the safety of each" could be "much more effectually secured" than by allowing workers to sue management for the negligence of other workers. 16 In addition to these 'worker-worker' relations, Shaw found three ways workers might help management improve job safety. First, workers could give 'notice' to management of unsafe conditions or irresponsible fellow servants. At that point "if the common employer" would "not take such precautions, and employ such agents as the safety of the whole party require," then the worker had a second alternative, which was to "leave the service" of the employer. 17 Thus, Shaw believed workers had a 'right to quit' if the job was dangerous, and after notice the employer refused to remedy the working conditions. Finally, Shaw argued in Farwell that the contract between a worker and management took into account the dangers of the job. In Shaw's scheme a 'compensation for dangerous work' category also explained why Farwell's suit for damages was an inappropriate way of securing job safety. In Shaw's mind, if a job was truly dangerous, a worker should bargain for a higher wage.
Besides these three remedies for dangerous work-'notice' to management; a 'right to quit,' and 'compensation for dangerous work'-Shaw argued that by accepting a dangerous job a worker voluntarily gave up any rights not contracted for. The worker's contract with the owner implied an assumption of risk and limited the liability of the employer. 16. Farwell, 4 met. at 59. 17. Id. 18. Id. at 60. In practice, of course, the economy of the nineteenth century did not function this way. The employees of large companies rarely bargained with their employers over salary or working conditions. As Charles Warren pointed out in 1895, "students of political economy know that as a matter of facts wages of a particular workman are not regulated" so "that an employee's compensation is regulated according to the risks." Warren, supra note 15, at 466. The other alternative, to "leave the service" of a company, forced a worker to quit and be without employment-which was a step few workers could afford. Similarly, as the facts of Farwell indicate, it would have been impossible for many workers to observe their fellow servants.
II The Tort Question: Could Slaves Be Fellow Servants?
For a variety of reasons, Shaw's Premises and theories, however dubious they were for northern workers, were almost entirely inapplicable to slaves used in southern industries. The nature of slavery made it impossible, in a legal sense, for workers-slave or free-to depend on slave fellow servants. None of the mutuality of interest and care that Shaw applied to free workers could apply to slave workers.
A: Mutual Skill
The assumption of "mutual skill" could not be applied to slaves for two reasons, one actual and the other ideological. First, masters could, and did, hire out slaves for tasks they were not capable of performing. Slaves, of course, had no legal way of opposing such a hiring. The coercive power of the master made it difficult for slaves to avoid labor they were unsuited for.
The ideological component of this question turns on the assumption that "fellow servants" would be mutually skilled. Noting that the switchman was an experienced, "careful and trustworthy servant" of the railroad, Shaw argued in Farwell that "where . . suitable persons [were] employed," the fellow servant rule would apply. 19 This implied that if an employer hired unsuitable persons, the rule would not apply.
The ideology of the South assumed that slaves could not be as skilled or as intelligent as whites. This expectation can be best understood through Thomas R. R. Cobb's An Inquiry Into the Law of Negro Slavery in the United States of America.20 This defense of black enslavement also explains why slaves could not be fellow servants. In his treatise Cobb asserted that "the negro race is inferior mentally to the Caucasian." Cobb found that
[t]he prominent defect in the mental organization of the negro, is a want of judgment. He forms no definite idea of effects from causes. He cannot comprehend, so as to execute the simplist orders, unless they refresh his memory as to some previous knowledge. He is imitative, sometimes eminently so, but his mind is never inventive or suggestive. Improvement never enters his imagination. ... This mental defect, connected with the indolence and want of foresight of the negro, is the secret of his degradation.21
Such racist claptrap was of course disproved daily, on every plantation and in every mine, factory or business which used slave labor. Indeed, had slaves been incompetent they would have been virtually useless to nonagricultural enterprises. The demanding jobs performed by slave boatmen, railroad workers, and miners belie the inferiority that Cobb attributed to them. But the issue here is not what was, but what the courts and the lawmakers believed. Similarly, slave workers obviously knew when a dangerous situation existed. The critical issue, however, is not what they knew as human beings, but rather, what their capacity was as slaves. To phrase the problem another way: because under the law and by social custom slaves were persons of limited status and capacity, they could not be held legally responsible in the same way that whites were. Cobb spoke for most Southerners when he asserted that slaves could not be expected to have good judgment, and indeed, were incapable of good judgment. Thus, would it be reasonable for lawyers and judges to expect that slaves could be held accountable for unsafe working conditions caused by themselves, their fellow servants, or their employers? If slaves could not be expected to form any "definite idea of effects from causes,"22 as Cobb put it, then the courts could not apply the fellow servant rule to them.
B: Mutual Observer and Mutual Notice
The ideological analysis used to explain the inapplicability of 'mutual skills' to slave workers, also applied to the categories of 'mutual observer' and 'mutual notice.' Applying these aspects of the fellow servant rule would have undermined the social structure of the South. These two categories must be understood in the context of the industrial use of slaves.
One striking aspect of antebellum industrial labor was its level of integration. Blacks and whites worked side by side in textile mills, mines, iron factories, and on railroads and steamboats.23 For example, the Tredegar Iron Company "pair[ed] blacks and skilled white ironworkers," to train slaves "for the most skilled and high-paying positions at the works." 24 Under Shaw's fellow servant rule workers were to observe each other and insure that unsafe conditions were not allowed. But It involves a necessity, not only for the discipline on the part of the owner requisite to procure productive labor from them, but for enforcing a subordination to the white race, which alone is compatible with the contentment of the slaves with their destiny, the acknowledged superiority of the whites, and the public quiet and security. .. .27 With such subordination, could a slave have questioned the actionshowever dangerous-of a white fellow servant? Would it have been permissible for a slave to "observe" the activities of a white and report them to another white? The answer, at least in a legal sense, must clearly have been no. Otherwise discipline and race control would have been undermined.28
Nor were slaves in a position to effectively observe other slaves. Presumably, all the slaves in an industrial situation were under the direction of a white.29 Could one slave question the activities of another, when the second slave was acting on orders from a white? Again, such a situation would have been an intolerable stress on the system. Thus Judge Joseph Henry Lumpkin, who was Thomas Cobb's fatherin-law, declared that the "interest to the owner and humanity to the slave, forbid" the application of the fellow servant rule to the peculiar institution. Only "free white agents" could be fellow servants in Georgia. This conclusion rested in part on the inability of slaves to observe fellow servants or give notice to whites. Lumpkin declared that slaves "dare not interfere with the business of others. They would be instantly chastised for their impertinence." Lumpkin reiterated, they "dare not intermeddle with those around" 26. State v. Caesar, 9 Iredell (N.C.) 391 (1849). This case involved a slave (Caeser) who had accidently killed a white man while the deceased was illegally beating a second slave. Ruffin dissented from the majority, which found that there was some justification for Caesar's actions, and thus he had not committed a capital offense. The material quoted below, however, is representative of a general view of how slaves ought to behave, and is not necessary to the outcome of the case. The Caesar majority no doubt agreed with Ruffin's remarks here, but simply thought that an exception should be made for this case. 29. The use of slave overseers would not change this. While slave overseers might have authority over slaves, they had that authority only to the extent that whites gave it to them. them, slave or free. "Bound to fidelity themselves" they could not possibly be the fellow servants of anyone they worked with. Slaves had "nothing to do but silently serve out their appointed time, and take their lot in the mean while in submitting to whatever risks and dangers are incident to the employment." 30
C: The Right to Leave Service
In the world that Chief Justice Shaw described, a worker could reprimand his fellow servants for their carelessness, and if that failed, the worker could take "leave of service." This option, 'the right to quit,' was not available to a slave. A slave leaving his place of employment would be a runaway. As T. R. R. Cobb explained, the slave could never leave his place of work "without the consent of his master." The moment a slave leaves his master "he is at all times subject to be retaken, and placed again under the power of the master." 31 Even running from a hirer back to an owner would not be legal. As Judge Ruffin noted in State v. Mann, "[o]ur laws uniformly treat the master or other persons having the possession and command of the slave as entitled to the same extent of authority. The object is the same-the services of the slave; and the same powers must be confided." Thus, a hired slave owed his labor to and was bound to obey, not his true owner, but the hirer. The facts of Mann illustrate this point, and the potential risks to a slave who attempted to avoid working in a dangerous place. In Mann a unanimous court reversed the assault and battery conviction of a white who had shot and wounded a rented slave when she "ran off" to avoid chastisement. Ruffin held that the hirer of a slave had exactly the same rights as the owner to punish or correct a slave. The question of "the liability of the hirer to the general owner for an injury permanently impairing the value of the slave" was left to "the general doctrine of bailment." But, as long as a hired slave was in the possession of a hirer, the slave was bound to be obedient to the temporary master, whose power "is conferred by the laws of man at least if not the law of God."32 Under this reasoning, a slave had no right to leave an unsafe workplace, even to return to his or her owner in order to escape a negligent hirer.
Georgia's Judge Lumpkin agreed with this analysis. In Scudder v. Woodbridge Lumpkin noted that a slave was totally at the command of his or her owner, or temporary master. Thus, if the deceased slave in this case "had been ordered by the captain to perform the perilous service in which he had lost his life, and he had refused," the ship captain would have been Under Shaw's theory an injured worker could only sue the fellow servant whose negligence caused his injury. Shaw, happy with his legal theories and legal fictions, never faced the fact that a fellow servant would probably be judgment proof, and thus the injured worker could never be compensated for his loss. Shaw was able to do this because it was at least theoretically possible for one worker to sue another. However, it was impossible for a slave to be sued by anyone. Thus, if a free worker or hired slave were injured by a negligent slave, and the fellow servant rule applied, there would have been no remedy for the injured party.
If a free worker were injured by a slave, and the fellow servant rule applied, then the outcome might have been similar to the actual result where the injury was caused by a judgment proof free worker. The injured party would not be able to collect damages. The losses would lay where they fell. The economic advantage of the fellow servant rule would have been maintained: the cost of injuries would be borne by free workers. But another outcome was more likely. Since slaves could never be sued, an application of the fellow servant rule to slaves might have made the owner of a slave liable for injuries caused to a slave's fellow servant. This would have shifted some of the burden of industrial accidents to the owners of hired-out slaves. Thus, in refusing to apply the rule to slaves the Louisiana This of course meant that the fellow servant rule could not benefit southern industry as much as it did northern industry. When slaves were injured by presumably judgment proof free whites southern courts could not shift to the burden of the loss to the fellow servant, because the loss would then be born by the slave owner. Equally important, the logic and the law of slavery precluded the application of the employee-to-employee aspects of the fellow servant rule. Slaves simply could not be fellow servants of their co-workers. Applying the fellow servant rule in this way would have eroded slave discipline and white-black relations. In effect, southern judges were forced to choose between protecting slaveowners and protecting industrialists. Not surprisingly, the courts of the South invariably chose to protect slave owners and their property interests. At one level the contract rationale, or market place approach, to industrial injuries was applicable to slavery. A slave owner could in fact take into account the risk to the slave when negotiating with the hirer. Thus, an owner renting a slave to a dangerous industry could ask for a higher rental fee, an insurance policy on the slave, or that the slave be kept from certain dangerous tasks. As the North Carolina court noted in 1858, "it is obvious that it is in [the master's] power also, by stipulations in the contract, to provide for the responsibility of the bailee for exposing the slave to extraordinary risks, or for his liability to the owner for all losses arising from any cause."39
III
This contract approach was, however, undermined by the status and value of a slave. A free worker might in fact be willing to assume a certain degree of risk for a larger salary. A "risk preferrer," to use modem concepts, might be willing to gamble with his own physical safety for the higher wage. But a slave had far fewer incentives to take such a risk. So, in fact, did the owner of a slave. Healthy slaves varied in value from five hundred dollars to more than a thousand.40 Few owners would risk a valuable slave merely to gain a small increment in the rental.
Nevertheless, owners did rent slaves out. In doing so they sometimes neglected to take into account the possible risks of the rental. They did this at their peri 1.41 Yet, merely making the renter liable for the value of a lost slave might not really make an owner "whole." Slaves, after all, were not completely fungible. A jury might not value a slave as much as a master did.42 A dead or injured slave might not be easily replaced. To avoid this problem some owners attempted to limit the kind of work their slaves would do. Owners rented slaves to mines on the condition that they not be sent underground,43 to railroad contractors and mines with the stipulation that they be kept away from explosives,44 and to ship owners with provisions that they be kept out of the water.45 Such limitations raised new problems, however, because industrial situations were not always predictable. If a ship was in danger of sinking, or was stranded, should the captain order a slave into the water in violation of the contract? If the slave remained on board the ship might sink. But if the slave joined the rest of the crew to help save the ship, and died in the process, the renter might be responsible for the death of the slave. Similarly, could a foreman always prevent a slave from being near explosives? Could a foreman be expected to remember which slaves could work near explosives and which could not?
All of these contractual problems complicated the attempt to limit the hirer's liability for an injured slave. The issue was further complicated by a critical ideological consideration. The limited liability of an employer under Shaw's opinion was based on the fact that the employee was a free agent, who could think and act for himself. It was not expected that an employer in a New England factory would have to carefully watch over his employees. They were expected to be able to care for themselves while doing their jobs. But slaves were theoretically incapable of self-regulation. Whether in the field or the factory they needed overseers to keep them at their jobs. Indeed, statutes throughout the South required that slaves be supervised by whites.46
Under such conditions it was impossible to assume that whites in charge of slaves should not be responsible for those slaves. Thus, the Louisiana court quoted Farwell to support the proposition that the hirer was not liable for the safety of those freeman working for him. But the slave was "a passive being, an immovable by the operation of the law,"47 and could never be a fellow servant of anyone. This analysis is, I think, incorrect. For the most part southern jurists agreed that the fellow servant rule was inapplicable to slavery.
IV
Virtually all slave state courts rejected the employee-to-employee aspects of Shaw's Farwell opinion. Southern judges were unwilling to admit that a slave could be the fellow servant of anyone. To do so would have undermined the entire nature of southern slavery. The only disagreements in this area concerned why the tort aspects of the rule could not apply to slaves. But, while rationales differed, the outcomes did not. 49 Similarly, all southern judges accepted the notion that a contract might limit the use of a slave by a hirer. This was not based on differing concepts of a "market relationship" since all judges recognized that the rental of a slave was in part a market place transaction. The only disagreements, and they were hardly "explicit," were over the extent to which masters needed to protect their property interest in rented slaves with specific contract provisions. The North Carolina courts placed a special burden on the master to negotiate limitations on the use of a slave. However, when limitations were negotiated, the North Carolina courts were willing to enforce them. Other slave jurisdictions were more likely to find implicit restrictions in contracts, based on the accepted and common use of slaves.50
When adjudicating disputes between owners and hirers southern courts faced one special problem unknown to northern courts: how to allocate responsibility for the injuries caused by the injured slave's own negligence. In addition to the employee-employee relations and the contract relationship within the fellow servant rule, there was implicit in Shaw's opinion the idea that contributory negligence would prevent an injured worker from winning a tort suit. If the employee negligently contributed to his or her own injury, then the employer would not be liable 48. Tushnet, supra note 42, at 183. 49. Alabama was the only slave state court that heard a slavery-related fellow servant rule case and did not explicitly reject its application to slaves. Here a hired slave died after a steamboat explosion. The court held that the steamboat engineer had committed "gross negligence, and a criminal inattention to his duties" and that the hirer was negligent because he had failed to fire the engineer. However, this was not such a simple matter for slave state jurists. Proslavery ideology asserted that slaves were irresponsible and incapable of caring for themselves. Therefore, it might be incumbent on the hirer of a slave to protect the slave from both the negligence of others and from his or her own negligence. Thus, in upholding damages to the owner for a slave injured by a blasting accident, the Virginia Court of Appeals noted that "the notorious improvidence and carelessness of our negro slaves" required that the hirers take special care to prevent slaves from negligently injuring themselves.52 Similarly, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a hirer was obligated to "watch over" the "lives and safety" of rented slaves. This was because the "improvidence" of slaves "demands it." Slaves were "incapable of self-preservation, either in danger or in disease."5
In rejecting the fellow servant doctrine for slaves, southern jurists developed four modes of analysis. Some courts used a combination of them. First, some courts used blatantly racist arguments against the application of the rule to slaves. These courts asserted that blacks had such limited capacities for judgment that they could not possibly be held responsible for their actions. Thus, the courts protected them from the negligence of others, including fellow servants. Second, some courts based their analysis on an idealized conception of how slaves actually performed their duties in the society. Since the slave was required by law to "stand to his post,"54 even in the face of lethal danger, the fellow servant rule was inapplicable to his situation. A third mode of analysis stemmed from the legally degraded position of blacks in the South. Since slaves were "wholly irresponsible, civiliter""55 for their actions they could not be fellow servants. A fourth mode of analysis rejected the rule because slaves were "property." As the Florida Court declared: "In all relations, and in all matters, except as to crimes, the slave is regarded by our law as property."56 As such, slaves could not be fellow servants, any more than a machine or a draft animal could be a fellow servant.
Southern courts applied these general concepts to the categories laid out by Shaw in Farwell. Courts explored whether slaves could be considered to have "mutual skill," could "observe" others in the workplace, give 51 Vol. XXXI "notice" to whites in charge, or could "leave service" when there was danger. In addition, courts analyzed the extent to which hirers were required to supervise and protect slaves from their own negligence. Similarly, courts explored the nature of the contract between an owner and a hirer. Some courts examined all aspects of the fellow servant rule, while others examined only parts of the rule.
One approach to the problems of slavery and the fellow servant rule is to examine how southern courts analyzed specific aspects of Shaw's opinion. This doctrinal approach demonstrates the overwhelming rejection of Farwell by southern courts adjudicating slavery related issues. It also has the advantage of providing an overview of "southern law" on the subject.
Certainly Hill. Hill hired his slave to one Randolph, the owner of a coal mine. One morning there was a "foul air" in the mine which made the workers ill. The next morning "the overseer superintending the pit ... sent down one of the negro labourers at the pit (who, it seems, was a slave belonging to Randolph) with a lamp ... to ascertain whether the foul air was gone, so that the labourers could be safely sent down." This slave, a foreman at the mine, was "one of the most experienced labourers at the pits, perfectly competent to make such an examination, and worthy of full confidence." He reported the pit was safe, and ten slaves, including Hill's, were sent down to work. Significantly, the court record notes that "none" of the slaves "were unwilling to go down" into the mine. Despite the assurances of the mine's safety, the workers quickly became ill and were drawn out as fast as it could be done, one or at most two at a time; no preference was given to Randolph's own slaves, one of whom was the last drawn up, sending before him the body of Hill's slave, who had fallen into some water in the pit, about eighteen inches deep: he appeared to have been drowned, and could not be revived: all the other labourers were made sick by the foul air, but none dangerously.64 
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No one disputed that previous to this accident both engineers involved in the collision had been "competent, trusty and faithful officers" of the railroad. Thus, the railroad was not negligent in who it hired. Nor was Arthur employed in violation of the contract for hire. The railroad had in fact specifically negotiated with Strachan to use Arthur as a fireman, and for this dangerous assignment "gave increased hire." The only question for the arbitrators was whether Arthur had been a "fellow servant" of the negligent engineer, and if so, whether that barred Strachan from recovering damages from the railroad. Citing Farwell and its successor cases from throughout the nation, the attorneys for the railroad argued precisely this point.72
Acknowledging the force of this argument, even as they rejected it, the arbitrators noted that their decision could not "be fully reconciled with the remarks of the judges in some of the English and American cases." But, those cases "related to free agents" which were "themselves irreconcilable with the views of the employer's liability in the case of slaves, assumed in the Southern cases" cited by Strachan's attorney. Citing Randolph v. Hill and the Georgia case of Scudder v. Woodbridge,73 the arbitrators concluded that slaves could never be fellow servants because they were "to be regarded, not merely as a person employed, but as a property bailed to the master under a contract for hire." In holding that a slave hiring was simply rental of property, the arbitrators avoided any complex analysis of the nature of slavery. They did, however, point out that an alternative analysis, leading to the same result, could be based on the "broader ground" that "the duty of passive obedience on the part of the slave, takes the case out of the operation of the rule in the case of free agents. .. "74 The strict limitations on the use of hired slaves was reaffirmed by the last Virginia case on the subject, Harvey v. Skipwith. Although initiated in 1853, because of continuances and retrials the case was not finally decided until 1863. Harvey, a railroad contractor, had hired Skipwith's slave Jefferson, with "the distinct understanding and agreement that the said slave should not be employed in or about the blasting of rocks or using powder, or exposed to hazard to life or serious injury from being thus dangerously 
The facts of Gorman were similar to those in Scudder. Gorman had hired his slave London to work on Campbell's steamboat. The boat became entangled in logs and the white hands went into the water to remove the obstructions. In accordance with local custom; the slave ship hands were ordered to remain on board. Nevertheless, London went into the water to help free the vessel. He worked at this "for about half an hour, in the presence and sight of the captain without anything being said to him." The captain ordered London to leave the water when the log he was cutting finally began to give way. However, before he could do this, London was swept away by the current and drowned. 89 When Gorman sued Campbell the judge charged the jury that "if they believe the boy London was engaged in the work by the express command or permission of the Captain" then Gorman should recover damages. But, if the jury "believed that the negro engaged in the work of his own free will, and the Captain forbid him to do it, the defendant was not liable, because the owner of the boat and its officers, are not required to keep the negro in chains" in order to keep him out of the water. Under this charge the jury found for the defendant ship owner, and Gorman appealed.90
At first glance this case does not appear to raise fellow servant issues. overstate the case in asserting that "the rule adopted in Gorman can be justified in the end only because humanity demands it."92 On the contrary, it was "a proper regard for the interest of the owner" that led to the result in this case. Slaves were valuable pieces of property, and Lumpkin believed that this property had to be protected from unnecessary destruction. Lumpkin further believed that the "improvidence" of slaves made them unable to care for themselves. Lumpkin thought slaves "incapable of selfpreservation, either in danger or in disease." Thus, Lumpkin asserted that the courts should make "it the interest of all who employ slaves, to watch over their lives and safety." Otherwise valuable property would be lost. Therefore, Lumpkin found that the hirer "not only may use coercion even to chains, if necessary, for the protection of the property from peril, but it is his duty to do so."93 The captain of Campbell's ship had failed to do this and as a result London had died. That made Campbell-and not, significantly, the captain-liable for the value of London.
In reaching his decision Judge Lumpkin cheerfully quoted the South Carolina Supreme Court, which had asserted that "it is in vain to say that the slave is a moral agent-capable of wrong as well as of right action."94 Indeed, the interest of the master required that the slave be seen solely as a chattel, which the hirer was required to protect.
C: Kentucky
In adjudicating cases involving hired slaves Kentucky rejected both the racism of the Virginia courts and the paternalism of the Georgia courts. The Kentucky court recognized the abilities and even the good judgment of slaves. Nevertheless, the Kentucky court concluded that slaves could not be fellow servants of other workers.
The Kentucky court did not directly face the application of the fellow servant rule to slavery until 1856, when the court explicitly rejected the rule in Louisville and Nashville Railroad v. Yandell.95 However, a decade earlier, in Swigert v. Graham, the Kentucky Court had implicitly rejected the application of the fellow servant rule to slaves.96 This case involved the drowning of Edmund, a slave owned by Graham and rented to Swigert and others, who owned the steamboat on which Edmund worked.
Graham argued that Swigert's agents, who were of course Edmund's fellow servants, had negligently allowed Edmund to drown while trying to 92. Tushnet makes much of this phrase, arguing that it shows the tension between "humanity" and economic "interest" in the antebellum South. Tushnet, supra note 42, at 3-6, 50-54. Attorneys for the railroad strenuously argued that the fellow servant rule prevented Yandell from recovering, because Henry had been injured by the negligence of other railroad workers. Citing Farwell, the railroad contended that the "authority to the effect that one agent injured by another agent, where they are employed to unite their labor to effect a particular object, can not recover from their common principal is overwhelming."' Judge B. Mills Crenshaw was unconvinced:
Whatever may be the wisdom and policy of this rule of law, when applied to free persons . . . we do not hesitate to reject its application to the present case, in which a slave was an employee;... There is, in our opinion, manifest propriety in distinguishing between . . . cases involving free persons on the one hand and slaves on the other, and in applying a different rule of law when a slave is an employee.'0' Judge Crenshaw explained why the fellow servant rule could not apply to slaves. In doing so he presented the position of the slave in society not as an incompetent racial inferior, but as a person whose status precluded any of the attributes of a free agent. The slave, in Crenshaw's view, was a passive tool:
A slave may not, with impunity, remind and urge a free white person, who is a co-employee to a discharge of his duties, or reprimand him for him for his carelessness and neglect; nor may he, with impunity, desert his post at discretion when danger is impending, nor quit his employment on account of the unskillfulness, bad management, inattention, or neglect of others of the crew. Even when faced with the "possible destruction of life or limb" the slave was required to "stand to his post." The slave was "fettered by the stern bonds of slavery-necessity is upon him, and he must hold on to his employment." Thus, the Kentucky court could "not perceive the propriety of applying this [fellow servant] doctrine to the present case, in which an injury to a slave is the complaint."
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The Kentucky court instead believed that cases of this kind "should be determined by the well-known principles ... of the bailment or hiring of slaves." The court admitted that in hiring a slave to a railroad or other dangerous enterprise an owner "must be understood as risking the dangers incident to the employment." But this did not include accepting the risks for "injuries inflicted upon a slave through the negligence and carelessness" of the hirer or his employees. For those injuries "attributable to the mismanagement or negligence of the bailee or his agents" the owner could recover damages. 103 As it had in Swigert, the Kentucky court also limited the standard of negligence to "such care, caution, and prudence, as persons generally, in the same circumstances, would observe towards their own slaves." The bailee was not required to maintain a standard of "the utmost care and caution" towards hired slaves.'" Where the employees of the bailee were negligent, the owner of an injured slave could recover damages, in spite of the fellow servant rule.
Unlike the Virginia courts, the Kentucky court did not base its decision on racist presumptions about the inferiority of slaves. On the contrary, the Kentucky court assumed that slaves were capable of perceiving dangers. Instead, the court reached its decision based on two presumptions about the nature of slavery: first, that a slave could not reprimand a white fellow servant for his carelessness, and second, that the slave was required "to stand to his post, though destruction of life or limb may never be so imminent." "10 This analysis also fit well into the ideology of the South. If slaves were to be loyal servants and workers then they must be protected from the negligence of those in authority over them. Otherwise, the masters would lose their property, and perhaps, the slaves might cease to be loyal. the contract between the owner and the hirer. Usually the hirer was not actually at the scene of the accident. These cases illustrate the willingness of the South Carolina court to protect the interests of the owner at the expense of the hirer. Although not explicitly fellow servant cases, the logic behind them was the same.
In Butler v. Walker, the slave George was hired to a railroad construction company owned by the Walkers. The contract for hire stipulated that the Walkers were "not to expose the slaves to rain, or other bad weather, or dangers of any kind." The hirers also agreed that George would not "labor before daylight or after dark." One day in early February, "between sundown and dark," George and the other slaves were sent back to their quarters, some distance from the work site. An employee of the railroad offered to take the slaves back to their quarters on a hand car, and the overseer agreed to this. On the way back a train approached the hand car, and all those on the car were compelled to leave it. At the time the car was on a bridge, and the occupants had to climb down the posts holding up the bridge. George fell while doing this, and died shortly thereafter. '08 In thus liable for Wesley's death. O'Neall refused to consider the conductor and Wesley to be fellow servants and also rejected the contention that "the slave was a moral agent, capable of wrong as well as right action, and that he killed himself by jumping off [the train] when he ought not." 9110 The "humanity" of the slave did not enter into the question. Quite the contrary, the South Carolina court treated the slave entirely as an object of a contract. The South Carolina court quoted Story on Bailments to the effect that if a "thing is used for a different purpose from that which was intended by the parties, or in a different manner, or for a longer period, the hirer is not only responsible for all damages, but if a loss occurs, although by inevitable casualty, he will be responsible therefore." Ill George was "a thing" misused, and the railroad was responsible for his value.
The concept of the slave as a "thing" was slightly modified in White v. Smith, in 1860. Here the court conceded that a slave was "still a man, wilful and intelligent, and capable of defeating all proper care on the part of those who have him in charge." Thus, if a slave "efficiently contributes to his own destruction" a hirer might not be held liable for the loss. But, where the agent of the hirer was at fault, the court had no doubt that the hirer himself was liable for the death of a slave."12
In this case White rented his slave, Charles, to Smith. Smith in turn left Charles "under the authority of Jackson," who worked for Smith. Jackson ordered the slaves under his control, including Charles, to board a train that was already in motion. In the process Charles slipped and was run over by the train.' 13 Smith argued that Charles and Jackson were "fellow servants" and thus he (Smith) In upholding the jury verdict the Florida court observed that the slave did not actually contract with anyone, and thus did not "voluntarily incur the risks and dangers incident to" any job. Nor could he protect himself "by refusing to incur the peril, or by leaving the service of his employer." The slave was merely "a passive instrument in the hand of those under whose control he is placed.""6 A passive instrument could not be a fellow servant.
In addition to his passivity, the slave was not a "person" under law. On the contrary, "in all relations, and in all matters, except as to crimes, the slave is regarded by our law as property" and thus subject solely to the law of bailments. 117 While not the most elegant opinion, the Florida court here was hardly "almost incoherent." 8 On the contrary, on one level this court understood the nature of the problem more clearly than other courts. The issue of a slave as a fellow servant could not be dealt with as a problem of labor law, precisely because slaves were not laborers; rather; they were objects, much like machines, to be rented out. Thus, the contract for hire in this case constituting a bailment of the property, and it being reciprocally beneficial to both parties, something more than mere goodfaith, on the part of the bailee, is requisite. The owners of the boat were bound to take ordinary care of the slave, and failing to do so, through their agent, they are responsible for the consequences. Because the hirers failed to take such care, and the slave died, the Florida court had no problem holding the hirers liable for the loss of the rented slave. Vol. XXXI steamboat Red Chief, and in this employment Tom fell overboard and drowned. The circumstances of the drowning were important in proving the negligence of the employees of the Red Chief. The Red Chief was lying next to another ship, the Judah Touro, in the New Orleans harbor. Tom and the other workmen were required to walk over the planks carrying heavy sacks of grain. In order to facilitate the off-loading from the Judah Touro, two six-foot wooden planks were laid across the sides of both boats. These planks were not fastened, and "there was nothing to hold them" on the Judah Touro and "nothing to prevent them from slipping" off the Red Chief. The two boats were not tied together or properly moored to the docks. Both boats were bobbing in the water, and would move whenever another boat passed by. It was a windy and rainy day and the water was rough. While carrying a sack Tom fell overboard and drowned. 121 In upholding damages for Howes the Louisiana court carefully considered "all the facts and circumstances of the case" and concluded that the method of transferring goods "was apparently defective, insecure and dangerous, and indicated a want of ordinary care, attention and foresight," of which Tom "was the unfortunate victim." 122 Having established negligence, the court next had to determine who was responsible for this negligence. The court recognized the importance of the fellow servant rule, and cited Farwell, Priestly v. Fowler, and a Louisiana case to support its general application to cases involving injured workers.'23 However, as with other Southern courts, the question here was not whether the fellow servant rule was a good rule, but whether it ought to apply to slaves. Here Louisiana sided with its neighbors, concluding that this was impossible.
Judge Albert Duffel emphatically rejected the idea that slaves could be fellow servants, declaring: "We will not discuss the status of a slave." The slave was "responsible to the State for his crimes, but in all other respects he is a passive being, an immovable by the operation of the law . . . he is entirely subject to the will of his master, who may correct and chastise him ... he is incapable of making any kind of contract." 124 Quoting the Florida Supreme Court, Duffel wrote: "In all relations, and in all matters, except as to crimes, a slave is regarded by our law as property."'25 Because "there could not, from the nature of the case, exist a privity of contract between the slave . .. and the defendants" the relationship between Tom and the free workers on the ship "were not the same, and must, by the force of the case, be governed by different rules. Judge Duffel noted that the problem of applying the fellow servant rule to slaves was two-fold. First, the slave was required by his status to always obey his master. If ordered to do something dangerous, he had no right to object-indeed, it might be illegal for him to do so. Second, if a slave was negligent and the fellow servant rule applied, who could an injured white sue?
Duffel did note the contract aspect of Shaw's Farwell opinion, but here again, like most other slave state courts128 Louisiana did not see that the rule was applicable to the South. Duffel conceded that in renting the slave the owner "took upon himself the ordinary risks of the dangers of navigation" but he was unwilling to "assent to the proposition that he has no recourse against the defendants for the loss of his property occasioned by the fault of their agents." Like Judge Lumpkin in Scudder, Judge Duffel realized that the life of a slave would mean little to the boatmen of the South if hirers were not liable for the slave's market value. The "usual carelessness of the steamboat-men, and unfortunately the too little value which is often set on human life, should not be a means of defence, but rather a forcible reason, in the interest of the community at large, not to enlarge the exceptions to the general rule which fixes liability of the master for the act of his agents."'129 This conclusion was not based on "humanity towards the slave," although Duffel no doubt objected to the wanton killing of slaves, as did most other southern leaders. Rather, this decision turned on the law of the slave states which made slaves property, and the need to protect that property from unnecessary destruction.
G: North Carolina
The major exception to the general trend in southern decision making on the fellow servant rule was North Carolina. The North Carolina court never completely adopted the fellow servant rule for slaves. However, in a 127. Id Vol. XXXI number of cases the North Carolina court showed more concern for protecting the rights of the hirers than in protecting the interests of the slaveowners.
Initially the North Carolina court followed the trends set by other slave state courts. Thus, in Dailey v. Dismal Swamp Company, the North Carolina court upheld damages for a slave, rented to the defendants, who drowned "in consequence of the misconduct of the defendants' servants in the management of their business."'130 The fellow servant rule was not an issue in this case, but the result was clearly a rejection of the rule for slaves rented to industries.
After Dailey the North Carolina court analyzed cases involving rented slaves in two ways. First, the court used a negligence standard that appears to be more rigorous than that used in other states. However, if negligence on the part of management, or on the part of the employees of management was found, then a slave owner might recover. Thus, in Heathcock v. Pennington, the owner of a slave could not recover from the hirer because the court found no negligence. The case involved a slave child between age ten and twelve, working in a gold mine at night, in the winter, and without proper clothing. The working conditions at the mine were generally unsafe, and in the early morning the young boy fell into the mine and died. 131 Courts in other states might have examined the facts more closely, and determined that the mine owners were negligent in not providing better supervision for the slave worker. But, finding no negligence, the North Carolina court easily concluded that the hirer was not liable.
However, when the North Carolina court did find negligence, it also assessed damages. Thus, in Sparkman v. Daughtry the court asserted "that the doctrine of respondeat superior applied" to the hirers of slaves. In this case the owners of a fishing vessel were held liable for the value of the slave Jacob, who drowned when the boat capsized. The boat had been taken out on "a very dark and stormy night," and this constituted negligence on the part of the owners and their servants, the crew. 32 Similarly, in Jones v. Glass the North Carolina court held the owner of a mine responsible for the negligent treatment of a hired slave by one of his employees. This slave suffered serious injuries from a beating which was "negligently" inflicted. Thus, recovery by the slave's owner was allowed.'33 But in Couch v. Jones, the same standard resulted in a different verdict. Here North Carolina's judges diverged from their southern counterparts. Couch's slave, Calvin,..was hired to contractors working on a railroad. During some nighttime blasting Calvin was killed by flying rocks after the contractor had set off a charge. The trial court charged the jury that Vol. XXXI liability to the owner for all losses arising from any cause."138 Having failed to do so, Ponton could not now sue for damages, unless there was gross negligence on the part of the railroad. This Ruffin did not find. Instead, Ruffin found that the railroad company had been diligent in hiring skilled workers, and this was the first time the switchman had failed to perform his duty.
In Ponton Ruffin essentially applied the fellow servant rule, not to the slave, but to the master. In effect, the master became the fellow servant of the railroad. The master could have demanded greater protections in the contract, but he did not. Similarly, the railroad was not negligent; only the switchman, the fellow servant, was negligent. What emerged from this decision is a two tier standard for industrial accident cases. If there was ordinary negligence by an employee of the hirer, and a slave was injured or died, then the owner could not recover from the hirer, unless there were specific contract provisions on that point. However, if there was gross negligence on the part of the company, in hiring incompetents or in not keeping the workplace safe, then recovery for harm to a slave might be possible.
Why Ruffin took a position different from all other slave state jurists is impossible to know. There are perhaps two logical answers. First, Ruffin was a "great" judge who saw himself as part of national legal culture. He may very well have been unable to break from the Farwell precedent, simply because all other major courts, except Ohio, seemed to follow it. Southern nationalists like Lumpkin and the members of the Florida and Virginia courts may not have been so constrained. This explanation is not, however, completely satisfactory. After all, the Kentucky court ought to have been with North Carolina on this issue if the standard was simply the outlook of the jurists.
It is also possible that Ruffin was interested in promoting industrial development in North Carolina. Certainly his decisions in fellow servant cases bear that out. In making a choice between industrialists and slaveowners, Ruffin apparently chose the former. However, he was the only southern jurist to do so, and he did it in a very limited fashion.
V Slave Fellow Servants and Southern Industrialization
Implicit in all southern court decisions on slavery and industrialization (except perhaps those of North Carolina) was a need to protect the interest of the master in his property. In deciding these cases the southern courts were forced to allocate the costs of industrialization between two property interests: the hiring industries and the owners of slaves. In siding with 138. Id. at 247. masters southern judges may have unconsciously indicated a hostility towards industry. More likely, however, they were simply applying the law as they understood it to the specific concerns of their society. As the cornerstone of southern s6ciety, slave property required the utmost protection.
There were many impediments to southern industrialization. At one level the fellow servant rule was not a very important one. After all, it was rare that slaves were injured or killed on the job. Even if railroads, mining companies, ship owners, contractors, and the like had been forced to absorb all the costs of injuries to slaves, these enterprises would probably have remained profitable.
However, at another level, the fellow servant cases illustrate the key problem of southern industrialization. The slave culture of the South required that slaves be limited in what they could do, where they could go, and most of all, what the law could expect of them. The ideology of slavery precluded courts and judges from treating slaves as the fellow servants of whites. The movement towards industrialization in the South was clearly hampered then, by the limitations on a large portion of the available labor. The law as developed in antebellum courts helps our understanding of this problem.
These cases also suggest that the South could not be part of a national legal culture if that culture undermined slavery. Even in North Carolina the courts were solicitous of the needs of masters, and simply asserted that they protect their property through contracts. If such contracts were made, the North Carolina court was ready to enforce them.
The cases on the fellow servant rule illustrate where the South diverged from the North, not only in economic development, but also in legal development. They illustrate great unity among southern jurists. In these cases southern judges cited each other more often than they cited northern judges. These cases also illustrate the tension between law in the antebellum South and the rest of the nation. The southern jurists showed a strong desire to be part of national legal culture. They cited Story and Shaw with respect and admiration. They acknowledged the importance of Farwell, and they generally wished to apply it to their own states. But, when the ideas of Story and Shaw came into conflict with the needs of the South's "peculiar institution," the result was fairly predictable. As they did in other contexts,139 southern judges were quite prepared to sever ties with the intellectual developments in the North or Great Britain, if those developments threatened slavery. Thus, southern judges spoke with near unanimity in declaring that slaves could never be elevated to the status of "fellow servants."
